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Abstract 
This paper defines the presently used methods and approaches in the domain of 
digital image forgery detection.  A survey of a recent study is explored including 
an examination of the current techniques and passive approaches in detecting 
image tampering. This area of research is relatively new and only a few sources 
exist that directly relate to the detection of image forgeries. Passive, or blind, 
approaches for detecting image tampering are regarded as a new direction of 
research. In recent years, there has been significant work performed in this highly 
active area of research. Passive approaches do not depend on hidden data to 
detect image forgeries, but only utilize the statistics and/or content of the image 
in question to verify its genuineness. The specific types of forgery detection 
techniques are discussed below. 
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1 Introduction          
Maliciously manipulate, and tamper digital images without leaving any obvious clues 
became very easy with the widely available, easy to use and extremely powerful 
digital image processing tools such as Photoshop. As a result, there is a rapid increase 
of the digitally manipulated splicing in mainstream media and on the Internet. This 
trend indicates serious vulnerabilities and decreases the credibility of the digital 
images. Therefore, developing techniques to verify the integrity and the authenticity 
of the digital images became very important, especially considering the images 
presented as evidence in a court of law, as news items, as a part of a medical record, 
or as a ﬁnancial document. In this sense, image tamper detection is one of the primary 
goals in image forensics. 
 
Fake images have become widespread in society today.  The accessibility to powerful 
simple to use image editing computer software to end users helps make the job of 
manipulating image incredibly easy.  One can find forged images used to sensationalize 
news, spread political propaganda and rumors, introduce psychological bias, etc. in all 
forms of media. Claims of image tampering are common in scandals and controversies.   
As the credibility of images suffers, it is necessary to devise techniques in order to 
verify their authenticity and trustworthiness of digital images [1]. 
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Before discussing the various types of forgery detection techniques in existence, it is 
important to know what forgeries they are dealing with.  To this end, we classify 
forgeries into five major categories. Fig. 1 depicts the classification of image forgery 
















One of the types of image tampering is splicing or composition or photomontage. In 
such a forgery, elements from multiple images are often juxtaposed in a single image to 
convey an idea that could not have been conveyed by any of the original images. Such 
an idea usually does not reflect reality, and so such spliced images can be very 















Fig. 2. Example of sliced images( source: todayoutlook.com). 
Fig. 2.shows a hoax image that surfaced right after flooding in Puerto Rico caused due 
to Hurricane Irene in 2011. The inset image shows a shark swimming down a flooded 
street, but is a hoax with the shark likely digitally inserted from the larger image 
published in a 2005 issue of Africa Geographic. 
 
Fig. 1. Classification of image forgery approaches 
 
Fig. 2.Example of sliced images( source: todayoutlook.com). 
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Such splicing can usually be detected by searching for the splicing boundary (or the 
effect of the splicing on image statistics), or by considering the directions of the light 
incident on surfaces in the image. Other abnormalities such as inconsistent 
demosaicking or chromatic aberration may also be used to determine the inauthenticity 
of such images. Inconsistencies in lighting or blurred splicing boundaries can be used 
to expose the above images as fake, if the light direction can be correctly estimated or 
if the splicing boundary can be correctly detected respectively. 
1.2 Copy-Move 
Another common type of image forgery is the copy-move (or region duplication or 
cloning) forgery. In this type of forgery, regions from the same image are copied and 
pasted (with possible transformations) in the same image. This is usually done with the 
intent of hiding certain content present in the original image or duplicating certain 
content not actually present in the image. Some examples of copy-move forgeries are 












The left panel in Fig. 3.shows an image that was used in a political advertisement for 
the presidential campaign of George W. Bush in 2004. It was created by copying and 
pasting a set of soldiers from the center of the image, over Mr. Bush, thus creating a 
more patriotic image of a child waving a flag in front of a sea of soldiers. 
 
Copy-move forgeries are usually detected by searching for matching regions in the 
image, although recent research has taken a more SIFT-based approach, concentrating 
on matching key points (as in object detection) rather than blocks, in order to allow for 
various image transformations that can be used to create more convincing forgeries. 
1.3 IMAGE Retouching 
Image Retouching can be regarded to be the much less harmful type associated with 
digital image forgery. Image retouching does not really considerably modify an image, 
however rather, improves or even decreases certain feature of an image (see Fig. 4.). 
This method is well-liked by magazine photo editors.  It can probably be asserted just 
about all magazine cover would utilize this technique to improve particular features of 
the image so that it can be more attractive; disregarding the truth that this kind of 




Fig. 3. Example of copy-move forgeries(source: conspiracy-
cafe.com). 
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Fig. 4. Example of retouched image (source: digitallybeautiful.blogspot.com). 
1.4 Image Processing Operations 
The types of forgeries described in this subsection and the next do not necessarily fall 
into the traditional definition of image tampering i.e. there is no addition or hiding of 
information.  However, as in the case of the image tampering discussed in this 
subsection, the reality portrayed by an image processing operationcan be distorted at a 














Fig.5. Example of processed images (source: mediabistro.com). 
 
Fig. 5.Shows an example of an image from the Charlotte Observer of July 2006 where 
the hue of the sky was changed from a dull brownish-gray to a fiery orange to yield a 
more striking effect.  It is debatable if this constitutes actual tampering because the 
content of the image remained unaffected.   However, the Observer considered the 
altering of image colors as a violation of its photo policy and fired the staff 
photographer who implemented the change, thus taking the stand that this was indeed a 
case of image tampering. 
 
It is possible to detect various types of filtering and tonal operations in images by 
studying the characteristics of images subjected to these operations, and then looking 
for similar characteristics in the image under examination. 
 
 
(a) Original Image            (b) Retouched Image 
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1.5 False Captioning 
The last type of image forgery that we discuss is probably the least like the other three 
types seen so far. In false captioning it is possible that the content of the image is not 
touched at all, but the caption of the image, which provides context, is changed from 
the actual situation with intent to mislead the viewer or reader. Examples of images 
where false captioning has been used are shown in Fig. 6. Apart from actual image 
captions, other informative elements like metadata (which can provide geographical or 
temporal context), may be tampered without changing the image content. Such 











Fig.6. Example of false captioning images (source: thedailybackground.com). 
 
 
Fig. 6.Shows US President George W. Bush carrying a turkey on a surprise visit to US 
troops in Iraq, during Thanksgiving in 2003. There was a spike in the president’s 
approval ratings after this trip, which had the above image as its most widely circulated 
one. However, it was later revealed that the particular turkey in the image was not 
meant for US troops at all, and the President has just picked it up. Thus, implied false 
context again distorted reality. Although not much work has been done in this regard, 
rudimentary AI-based techniques have been proposed to detect wildly incorrect or 
implausible captioning in images. Certain techniques also allow for identification of 
source cameras by using camera-specific characteristic like color filter arrays, sensor 
noise patterns, etc. The camera make and model is often recorded in the image 
metadata and so, these techniques can be applied to verify these metadata elements. 
However, color filter array patterns often tend to overlap between different models of 
cameras, and identifying a camera from its sensor pattern noise requires access to the 
specific camera. 
2 Passive Approaches 
Passive, or blind, approaches for detecting image tampering are regarded as a new 
direction of research. In recent years, there has been significant work performed in this 
highly active area of research. Passive approaches do not depend on hidden data to 
detect image forgeries, but only utilize the statistics and/or content of the image in 
question to verify its genuineness. General surveys of this field may be found in 
[2,3,4]. The specific types of forgery detection techniques are discussed below. 
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2.1 Pixel-based Techniques 
The most obvious way of identifying image forgeries has to be to look at the pixels 
constituting the image. Various techniques either directly or indirectly utilize possible 
correlations that occur between pixels as a result of tampering. 
 
 One of the most common types of image forgeries is known as the copy-move (or 
copy-paste or cloning) forgery . In this particular type of forgery, one region of the 
image is concealed by using another region from the same image to cover it. The 
copied region may be subjected to some image processing operations in order to make 
cloning difficult to detect visually. 
 
As the cloned regions can be of any shape and location, it is infeasible to search all 
possible image locations and sizes. Dividing the image into blocks and applying a brute 
force search is also computationally prohibitive, besides not being robust to simple 
anti-forensic measures like noise addition. Therefore, initial work in this direction 
focused on better representing the image blocks. Two of the most prominent techniques 
that emerged [5] and [6] use the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) respectively, in order to efficiently search for matching 
blocks in the image. Besides, they are also robust to minor variations in the image due 
to additive noise or lossy compression. Recently, other techniques [7,8] have emerged 
which are robust to additional transforms like scaling, rotation and contrast changes. 
Although these methods can detect cloning in an image, they are still quite 
computationally intensive, and tend to produce a lot of false positives. Moreover, a 
human interpretation of the output is necessary for these techniques. 
 
In order to create convincing forgeries, it is often necessary to apply various image 
processing operations to the image. The detection of such operations indicates that the 
image is not in the same form as captured, and may have been tampered with. For 
instance [9,10], propose methods to detect median filtering in images. [9] propose a 
method to detect if an image has been subjected to gamma correction, while [10] check 
for contrast enhancement, including histogram equalization. Another characteristic 
which can be exploited to detect composite images is the presence of resampling. In 
order to create convincing composites, it is often necessary to resize certain objects. 
Such resizing introduces certain unnatural correlations between neighboring pixels, 
which, if detected, can indicate possible tampering in the image. Examples of 
techniques that utilize traces of resampling to detect forgeries are[10,11,12,13]. 
Although the work of [11] improves upon previous related work by considering phase-
dependent resampling prediction rather than linear resampling prediction, strong JPEG 
compression tends to create artifacts which can hide traces of filtering and resampling, 
which is a limitation of these techniques. 
 
Even in the absence of resampling, creating composites (also known as splicing) gives 
rise to certain abnormalities at the splicing boundary. If the splicing is done carefully, 
then the boundary between the regions can be visually imperceptible. However, higher-
order Fourier statistics are disrupted by splicing, which can hint at the presence of 
splicing [14] Techniques based on this principle utilize the bispectrum to analyze 
higher-order correlations between frequencies. As with the above techniques, 
compression artifacts tend to limit the applicability of these methods. 
It is important to note that perceptually meaningful images are not collections of pixels 
having random intensities. For example, pixels tend to display correlations with their 
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neighbors, corresponding to objects in the images. There are other statistical properties 
which can be examined to verify image authenticity. Methods that examine such 
statistical properties make use of statistical moments from a wavelet decomposition of 
the [15], and local co-occurrence characteristics in image bit-planes [16]. 
Such techniques have found wide application, for instance, in distinguishing between 
photorealistic and photographic images [17,18] (with the latter improving performance 
by using an increased number of features along with boosted feature selection to 
manage computational complexity). These techniques typically require uncompressed 
images or JPEG images with a high quality factor to be successful. 
2.2 Format-based Techniques 
One of the most common image formats used today is the JPEG lossy compression 
format. This is based on representing the image as Discrete Cosine Transform (Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT)) blocks, and quantizing the resulting coefficients. This 
quantization is the source of the lossy compression in this technique. Such compression 
gives rise to certain artifacts which can be exploited to detect tampering. 
 
The manner in which the DCT coefficients in each block are quantized is determined 
by a quantization table. The quality of the image and its size is determined by the 
quantization table, and these tables tend to differ between camera manufacturers. This 
difference between tables may be exploited to perform a forensic analysis on the image 
to determine its source camera [19,20]. The quantization table may be available in the 
header of the JPEG image, or may be determined blindly as in [21]. One of the 
limitations of this technique is that the quantization table used within a camera often 
depends on the quality setting at which the image is captured. Moreover, with the 
incredibly large number of digital cameras available commercially, there is bound to be 
some overlap of the quantization tables. Hence, such a method alone cannot provide 
conclusive evidence of the source of an image. 
 
Another case to consider is that of a JPEG image being tampered with and resaved. 
This results in the JPEG image being compressed twice. Such double compression 
gives rise to certain artifacts not visible in singly compressed images. Techniques 
presented in [22,23] (with addressing the difficult case of the quantization matrices for 
both compressions being the same) describe methods to detect these artifacts, and 
provide evidence of manipulation. However, it is to be noted that detection of such 
double compression does not necessarily imply malicious intent. Forinstance, it is 
entirely possible to resave an image with a lower quality factor for faster transmission 
over a communication network. 
 
As each block is transformed and quantized independently from other blocks in a JPEG 
image, horizontal and vertical edges often appear between blocks as artifacts. When a 
JPEG image is tampered with, certain aberrations may result in these artifacts. 
Detection of these aberrations as described in [24,25,26] can detect manipulations and 
manipulated regions in images 
 
Obviously, these techniques do not work for non-JPEG images, as they rely on the 
artifacts introduced by the JPEG process. Also, knowing that an image has been 
resaved is often not enough, when it is required to know the specific tampering that has 
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occurred. 
2.3 Camera-based Techniques 
It is often necessary to establish the source of an image - in a court of law, for example 
even if the image has not been specifically tampered with. As cameras are not perfect 
imaging systems, there are certain artifacts present in cameras which can be used to 
associate an image with a specific camera. Various techniques exist to facilitate this 
form of image forensics. 
 
Camera lens aberrations can often be used to identify the source camera, and even to 
detect image tampering. For instance, [27] proposes a technique to identify the lens 
with which an image was captured by analyzing the artifacts in the image resulting 
from dust specks on the lens. It is important to note that a negative result from this 
technique does not necessarily mean that an image could not have originated from a 
camera with a particular lens, because the lens may have been cleaned of the dust. 
Another lens aberration that can be employed is lateral chromatic aberration [28,29,30]. 
This results from the tendency of light of different wavelengths to be bent to different 
extents by the lens resulting in an expansion or contraction of the color channels with 
respect to each other. If another object is added into the image, it is likely that the 
expansion/contraction pattern will be disturbed allowing for the tampered region to be 
detected. Such a technique works well only for non-compressed or non-uniform parts 
of the image, although [31] reports improved performance by using a more visible, but 
also more region-dependent, purple fringing aberration as a generalization of local 
chromatic aberration. 
 
In order to keep costs low, most digital cameras often have a single CCD or CMOS 
sensor in order to capture color images. This is accomplished by using a color filter 
array (CFA). Each sensor element records only one of red, green or blue color channel 
samples and interpolates the missing two from the neighboring samples. This process is 
known as demosaicking, and the particular algorithm adopted (bilinear, bicubic, 
adaptive, etc.) can be used to distinguish between cameras. The particular type of 
interpolation can be identified from the statistical periodic correlations introduced 
between subsets of pixels in each color channel [12,32,33] . The technique of [33] 
generalizes the approaches of previous techniques and performs well in correctly 
identifying a large number of demosaicking algorithms. Deviations from the periodic 
correlation pattern can be used as evidence of global or local tampering. 
 
As camera sensors tend to be linear, a linear relationship is expected between the 
intensity of light incident on each sensor and the resulting intensity value of each pixel. 
However, in order to enhance the final image, cameras often apply a pointwise 
nonlinearity. This nonlinear mapping can be estimated and discrepancies in the 
mapping can be used to detect tampering, as described in [31,34]. As with many other 
techniques, compression artifacts can make it very difficult to localize forgeries. 
 
Images captured with digital cameras are subjected to a number of image processing 
operations between the camera sensor and memory, such as white balancing, contrast 
enhancement, filtering, etc. It is possible to model these operations and detect if an 
image has undergone any subsequent processing [35].Camera sensors also contain 
various sources of noise, such as dark current noise and photoresponsenonuniformity 
(PRNU) noise. The latter has been shown to be distinct for specific sensors [36], and 
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can be used to identify the specific camera with which the image was captured. 
However, this technique requires access to the camera or a large number of images 
taken with the camera. 
2.4 Physics-based Techniques 
One of the biggest challenges in creating a convincing spliced image is to match the 
light-source directions of the images being combined. Differences in lighting can be 
used as evidence of tampering in an image. The techniques in this subsection 
necessitate human interpretation of the output because of their nature. 
 
The lighting direction can be estimated at various points in an image from the two-
dimensional surface normals at the occluding object boundary [37]. By assuming 
Lambertian surfaces with constant reflectance values and a point light source at infinite 
distance, a set of equations can be solved for the lighting directions and ambient light 
terms. Inconsistencies in lighting can, and have, been used to expose various forgeries. 
 
As 3-D surface normals are difficult to estimate from an image in general, there still 
remains an ambiguity in the light source direction in the above technique. [37] helped 
remove this ambiguity in certain cases where the image contains people, and their eyes 
are clearly visible. This is accomplished by using the specularity resulting in the eye 
from the light source. The 3-D normals are determined from the 3-D model of the 
human eye. This estimated direction can be compared for various people in the image, 
or with the estimated direction as explained above. 
 
In practical scenarios, multiple light sources may be present, instead of a single 
dominant one as assumed so far. [36] Discuss how a lowparameter representation of 
such a complex lighting environment may be achieved. By assuming the light striking a 
Lambertian surface to be a weighted sum of spherical harmonic functions, the light 
source directions in two dimensions may be estimated and checked for consistency 
across the image. 
 
In specific cases, computer graphics techniques have been used to simulate the physical 
conditions of the scene depicted and check its feasibility [39,40]. However, 
considerable human intervention is needed in the creation of the scene models, and it is 
difficult to generalize such techniques. An attempt at generalization is found in [41] 
where morphable 3-D models of human faces are used to check for lighting direction 
consistency. Although such a technique reduces the amount of human input needed, it 
is still limited to a very specific subset of image forgeries. 
 
2.5 Other Techniques 
The above subsections outline the major classes into which forgery detection 
techniques tend to fall. There are other techniques as well, which do no neatly fall into 
the above categories. These usually rely on semantic or geometric knowledge of the 
scene depicted in the image. 
 
Sometimes, it may so happen that the content of a digital image is another digital 
image, either being viewed on a screen or having been printed as a hard copy. This is 
known as image recapturing and although not technically a forgery in its own right, it 
can prove to be an obstacle for camera and image forensics techniques. Various 
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approaches [42,43] have been formulated to deal with the detection of such 
recapturing. However, they depend on the surface characteristics of the source of the 
recaptured image (LCD screens [42], printing paper [42,43], etc.) which are difficult to 
identify with common image post processing operations such as JPEG compression and 
contrast enhancement. 
 
In an un tampered image, the projection of the camera center onto the image plane the 
principal point - is located near the center of the image. In a spliced image, the location 
of objects can differ from their locations in the individual original images. In copy-
move forgeries, objects or regions are often translated across the image. Both such 
operations result in the principal point moving proportionally. [43] Describe a 
technique to estimate the principal point of a camera from certain planar geometric 
shapes present in the image, and utilize discrepancies in the estimate to provide 
evidence of tampering. 
 
It is often difficult to discern certain details in an image because of the angle at which 
the shot was captured. In [44], various projective geometric tools are reviewed. These 
tools allow for metric measurements to be made from a single image, under certain 
assumptions. These depend on knowledge of polygons, vanishing points and 
coplanarity of circles in order to remove planar distortions that enable metric 
measurements to be made on the plane. 
 
[38] Propose a method that utilizes the differences in geometry between authentic and 
computer-generated images in order to distinguish between the two. These differences 
include the non-uniform nature of real objects versus the relatively smooth surfaces of 
computer-generated objects, and lighting assumptions such as isotropy that are used in 
creating photorealistic images, but may not be valid for photographic images. The 
technique for identifying these differences is inspired by the physics of the image 
formation process, but requires high-quality images. 
 
An important issue in image forgery detection is the semantic content of the image. In 
[41], perceptually meaningful regions of an image are found and, using AI techniques, 
checked against characteristics of such regions to detect false captioning. However, the 
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